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Improving quantum secret-sharing schemes
Anderson C. A. Nascimento, Joern Mueller-Quade, and Hideki Imai
Third Department, Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 153-8505, Japan
~Received 21 February 2001; published 17 September 2001!
We propose a protocol that enables a dealer to share a quantum secret with n players using less than n
quantum shares for several access structures. For threshold schemes we derived an expression that shows how
many quantum shares can be saved in this scheme. Also, several features that are available for classical
secret-sharing schemes ~and previously not known to be possible for quantum secret-sharing! become available
with this protocol.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.64.042311 PACS number~s!: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret-sharing schemes were independently introduced by
Shamir @1# and Blakley @2# in 1979. They are fundamental
building blocks of multiparty computation protocols @3#, un-
conditionally secure key distribution @4#, digital signature
schemes @5#, as well as of key management schemes @6#. In a
classical secret-sharing scheme, a dealer shares a secret by
distributing pieces of information among a set of players in a
way, that only authorized subsets of the players’ set will be
able to recover the secret. Recently, this concept was gener-
alized to the quantum scenario. In @7# Hillery et al. proposed
a scheme where an unknown qubit can be shared with two
players, such that to recover the original qubit the players
have to put their pieces of quantum information together. In
@8# Cleve, Gottesman, and Lo presented a more general
scheme where a dealer can share an unknown quantum state
with a set of players in a way that only authorized groups of
players can recover the original secret and collusions of un-
authorized players cannot get any information about it. The
construction in @8# was based on quantum error-correcting
codes. A construction for general access structures based on
monotone span programs was presented in @9# by Smith.
Differently than quantum key exchange and other quan-
tum cryptographic protocols such as quantum bit commit-
ment, the main aim of quantum secret sharing is not to
achieve a level of security that is impossible in the classical
world. Rather, the aim is to share a different kind of data: an
unknown quantum state. If quantum computers become a
reality, quantum secret sharing could possibly play an impor-
tant role in distributed quantum secure computations.
In classical secure multiparty computations, several com-
puters interconnected by a network want to compute the
value of a function, which depends on secret inputs of all the
players. Some users might collude to cheat in the protocol as
to obtain information about the secret inputs of other players
or to modify the result of the computation. In a quantum
version of a secure multiparty computation, a group of users
would like to compute a quantum state by inputting quantum
as well as classical data in a way that no allowed collusion of
cheaters can get any information about the inputs of other
players or alter the result of the computation.
A fundamental issue when dealing with secret-sharing
schemes is the amount of data that must be given to the set of
players. The smaller the amount of data given to the set of
players the better. This issue becomes even more important
when dealing with quantum secret sharing. As quantum data
is expansive and hard to deal with, it would be desirable to
use as little quantum data as possible in order to share an
unknown quantum state. In this paper we show that quantum
data and classical data can be used together in a hybrid quan-
tum secret-sharing scheme in order to reduce the amount of
quantum data that has to be distributed to the players. As
classical data is much easier to store, transmit, and receive,
this result significantly improves the viability of quantum
secret-sharing schemes.
It is interesting to note that, in this case, classical data
help one to perform a completely quantum task. This is not
the case with data compression @10# or with the quantum
capacity of a quantum channel @11#. In @11# Adami and Cerf
proved that a classical forward channel connecting two par-
ties cannot increase the capacity of a quantum channel be-
tween them. In @10# Barnum et al. proved that no part of the
quantum-information content of a quantum source can be
faithfully replaced by classical information.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we introduce
our notations and give some preliminaries. In Sec. III we
state our main results and in Sec. IV we introduce features of
quantum secret-sharing schemes that become available with
our results. Finally, in Sec. V we give our conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Classical secret-sharing schemes
As stated in Sec. I, a secret-sharing scheme is a protocol
that enables a dealer D to share a secret S with a set of
players P so that the members of an authorized group will be
able to recover S, but no other members can get any infor-
mation about the secret S. The authorized groups will be
defined by an access structure G , a family where each ele-
ment is an authorized group. The secret-sharing scheme will
be called perfect if ~1! each set listed in G can recover the
secret S with absolute certainty, and ~2! none of the subsets
not listed in G can get any information about the secret S.
When uPu5w and G5$B#P:uBu>t% we say we have a
(t ,w)-threshold scheme.
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B. Quantum error-correction codes and quantum secret
sharing
In @8# Cleve, Gottesman, and Lo introduced the notion of
quantum threshold schemes. It was based on quantum era-
sure correction @12–15#. In an @n ,k# quantum error-
correcting code, a quantum state uX&PH k ~where H k is the
k-dimensional Hilbert space! is associated with another vec-
tor uc&PH n called a codeword, where n>k . The set of all
codewords is a linear subspace X# H n with dim X5k . Let
U be a unitary transformation that represents the action of the
environment introducing errors in a quantum state uf&
PH n. If these errors are local errors, the action of this uni-
tary operator U on the quantum state uf&PH n can be ex-
panded in terms of $I ,X ,Y ,Z% ^ n, where X ,Y and Z are the
three Pauli operators.
Therefore, we have that in H n the errors can be repre-
sented by tensor-products operators, Ea5 ^ 1< j<na j , where
a5(a1 ,a2 , . . . ,an), a jP$I ,X ,Y ,Z%. The number of a j
ÞI in a word a will denote the weight of a and will be
represented by w(a). A quantum code X is called E-error
correcting if ; a ,b with w(a),w(b)<E and for ;f ,c
PX,
^cEauEbf&5^cuEaEbuf&5ba ,b^cuf&, ba ,bPC
if additionally, ba ,b50, unless a5b , the code is said to be
nondegenerate. It is important to remark that a and b are
independent of ^cuf& . It is a well-known result that an
E-error-correcting quantum code can correct 2E erasures.
The minimum distance of a code can be defined as the
minimum number of undetected errors. An @n ,k# code with
minimum distance d is referred as an @n ,k ,d# code. Cleve,
Gottesman, and Lo exploited the fact that if we trace over
any n2t subset of qubits of a codeword uc&P H n in an
@n ,k ,d# code with d5t21, we have that
r (t)5tr(n2t)uc&^cu5
1
2 t
I
is the complete mixture. Therefore, by measuring any subset
of dimension smaller or equal to t21, it is impossible to get
any information about the complete state uc& . This is a con-
sequence of the fact that any information extracted out of a
quantum state implies disturbance of the state. Therefore, if
we want to protect a quantum state composed of n qubits
from errors in any subset of k qubits, we have to ensure that
any measurement performed ~maybe by the environment! on
any subset of k qubits will get no information about the state.
It follows that in order to implement a (t ,w) quantum thresh-
old secret-sharing scheme, we must have a @2t21,1,t# quan-
tum code @8#.
It is interesting to note that not all access structures can be
implemented by quantum secret-sharing schemes. This re-
striction comes from the no-cloning theorem @16#. This theo-
rem states that it is impossible to clone with perfect fidelity
an unknown quantum state. Therefore, any access structure
that has two disjoints subsets cannot be implemented. In an-
other paper @17#, Gottesman generalized the results obtained
for threshold schemes to general access structures. It was
stated in @17# that in a quantum secret-sharing scheme, the
size of the shares must be at least that of the secret to be
shared and all the important players must receive one quan-
tum share.
C. Encryption of qubits
In the next section we show how to overcome this limi-
tation by use of an interesting tool proposed in @18#: the
encryption of quantum bits, which is briefly reviewed in this
section. The encryption scheme works as follows: suppose
we have a quantum state uc& composed of n qubits and a
random sequence of 2n classical bits, each pair of classical
bits is associated with a qubit and it determines which trans-
formation sP$I ,X ,Y ,Z% is applied to the respective qubit. If
the pair is 00, I is applied, if it is 01, X is applied, and so on.
It is easy to see that if s is chosen at random from $I ,X ,Y ,Z%
the resulting state uc˜ & is the complete mixture and no infor-
mation can be extracted out of it. However, if someone
knows the classical sequence of bits, the sequence of opera-
tors that were applied to uc& is known and, as they are uni-
tary transformations, they can be reversed and uc& can be
recovered. Therefore, classical data can be used to encrypt
quantum data.
III. IMPROVING QUANTUM SECRET-SHARING
SCHEMES
In this section we show how to improve quantum secret-
sharing schemes, in terms of reducing the number of neces-
sary quantum shares, by using quantum encryption. First, we
give an example: suppose we want to share a quantum secret
uS& with a set of players P5$A ,B ,C ,D ,E% realizing an ac-
cess structure G5$(A ,B ,C),(A ,D),(A ,E)%. If we encrypt
the quantum state uS& ~using a classical key K) into another
quantum state uS˜ & using the method described in Sec. II C
and give uS˜ & to the player A, we can share the classical key
by a classical secret-sharing scheme that realizes G . The
player A cannot recover uS& from uS˜ & because he does not
have the key. Only the subsets present in G can recover the
classical key and the encrypted state together. By using this
hybrid ~classic-quantum! secret-sharing scheme, we can re-
alize the access structure G by giving quantum data plus
some classical data to the player A, and only classical data to
all the other players. This has some advantageous features;
for example, classical data is much easier to store, transmit,
and receive than quantum data. However, not all the access
structures can be improved in this way. For example, if we
analyze a (2,3)-secret-sharing scheme, we realize that there
is no way to distribute quantum data to only some members
of the set of players. We now give a definition of improvable
secret-sharing schemes.
Definition 1. A quantum secret-sharing scheme realizing
an access structure G5$A1 ,A2 , . . . ,Ar% among a set of
players P5$P1 ,P2 , . . . ,Pn% is improvable if less than n
quantum shares are sufficient to implement it.
The following theorem answers the question of when a
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quantum secret-sharing scheme realizing a given access
structure can be improved.
Theorem 1. For a conventional quantum secret-sharing
scheme realizing an access structure G5$A1 ,A2 , . . . ,Ar%
among a set of players P5$P1 ,P2 , . . . ,Pn%, it is ‘‘improv-
able’’ if there exists at least one PiPA jPG , 1< j<r such
that GuP2Pi does not violate the no-cloning theorem, where
GuP2Pi denotes the restriction of G to P2Pi .
Proof. If GuP2Pi does not violate the no-cloning theorem,
there exists a quantum secret-sharing scheme that realizes
GuP2Pi. We can implement a hybrid scheme realizing G in
the following way: we encrypt the shares of GuP2Pi with a
classical key K and share it using a classical secret-sharing
scheme realizing G . As G is a monotone access structure, the
existence of a classical secret-sharing scheme implementing
G is easily proved by using any of the well-known construc-
tion techniques for monotone access structures present in the
literature ~such as @19#!. All the sets in GuP2Pi can recover
the encrypted shares, but only the sets in G can recover the
encrypted shares and the classical key together. j
Now we formalize the notion of minimal and optimal
restricted-access structure.
Definition 2. A realizable restriction of an access structure
G5$A1 ,A2 , . . . ,Ar% to a subset B#P5$P1 ,P2 , . . . ,Pn% is
a family GuB5$AiøB%:AiPG that satisfies the no-cloning
theorem, and BøAiÞB , ;AiPG . GuB is called minimal if
it is not improvable, and it is optimal if there is no other
D#P such that GuD is minimal and uDu,uBu.
We now give a protocol that implements an improved
quantum secret-sharing scheme among a set of players P
5$P1 ,P2 , . . . ,Pn%, realizing an access structure G when its
realizable minimal restriction GuB is known. In this improved
scheme only uBu quantum shares are needed, instead of uPu.
Distribution phase. ~1! Choose a random classical encryp-
tion K. Encrypt the quantum secret uS& using the encryption
algorithm described in Sec. II C. The encrypted state will be
denoted uS˜ &. ~2! Using a normal quantum secret-sharing
scheme, share uS˜ & with the set of players realizing GuB . Each
member of B will receive a quantum share uQi&, 1<i
<uBu. ~3! Using a classical secret-sharing scheme share K
with the set of players realizing G . Each member of P
5$P1 ,P2 , . . . ,Pn% will receive a classical share C j, 1< j
<n .
Reconstruction phase. ~1! Collect the quantum shares
from the members of B. ~2! Collect the classical shares from
the members of P. ~3! Reconstruct the encrypted quantum
secret uS˜ & and the classical key K. ~4! Decrypt uS˜ & by using
K.
It is easy to see that the protocol described above shares a
quantum secret with a set of players so that only the groups
of players specified by G will have access to the quantum
secret. However, we have to note that it is not easy to com-
pute the minimal access structure for a general access struc-
ture G . This task can be made easier if G has certain sym-
metry. This is the case of an important class of access
structures: the so-called threshold schemes.
A. Threshold schemes
In order to find out this expression, we first state the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 1. A restriction of a threshold scheme is always a
threshold scheme.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from the defini-
tion of threshold schemes.
The following lemma gives us the expression for the op-
timal restriction of a threshold scheme.
Lemma 2. If a (k ,n)-threshold scheme does not violate
the no-cloning theorem, its minimal access structure is equal
to the optimal one. Moreover it is given by the expression
(k2g ,n2g) where g52k2n21.
Proof. From lemma 1 we know that a restriction of a
threshold scheme is always a threshold scheme. Therefore, a
restriction of a (k ,n)-threshold scheme must be of the form
(k2g ,n2g) for an integer g . From the no-cloning theorem
we know that k2g.(n2g)/2)2k2n.g , so the minimal
restriction has g52k2n21. j
Example 1. Suppose a threshold scheme (99,100). In a
conventional quantum secret-sharing realization of this ac-
cess structure, all the 100 players must receive a quantum
share that is as large as the secret to be shared. However,
from lemma 5 we know that its minimal restriction is a
(2,3)-threshold scheme. Therefore, we just need three quan-
tum shares in order to implement a hybrid quantum secret-
sharing scheme realizing a quantum (99,100)-threshold
scheme. Following the same logic, we see that an
(n ,n)-threshold scheme can be realized with only one quan-
tum share.
B. General access structures
The analysis for general access structures is more compli-
cated. We just improve a construction technique that was
presented in @17#. First, we remember a construction of gen-
eral access structures from threshold secret-sharing schemes
proposed in @19# by Benaloh and Leichter. It is based on
monotonic circuits. With each general access structure, Be-
naloh associated a special kind of boolean circuit called
monotonic circuit. Suppose we have a boolean circuit with
Boolean inputs, which represent the players, and one output
y. The basic idea is to have a circuit that recognizes an au-
thorized group of users. It means that the output y will be 1
if an authorized group of players is used as the input of the
circuit. As the circuit is monotonic, changing one input from
1 to 0 does not change the output from 0 to 1 ~excluding
members of an unauthorized group will not change it into an
authorized one!. Afterwards, we could build up a secret-
sharing scheme from the description of the circuit. To ensure
the monotonicity of the circuit we will use only AND (‘)
and OR (~) gates.
Example 2. Following Benaloh’s representation, an access
structure G5$(A ,B ,C),(A ,D)% would be represented by the
circuit y5(A‘B‘C)~(A‘D).
In a classical secret-sharing scheme, an access structure
can be realized by associating the AND gates with a
(q ,q)-threshold scheme and the OR gates with a
(1,r)-threshold scheme. In the given example, (A‘B‘C)
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would be realized by a (3,3)-threshold scheme and the OR
would be realized by a (1,2)-threshold scheme. This con-
struction does not directly apply to the quantum scenario
because (1,r) quantum threshold schemes do not exist for
r>2 due to the no-cloning theorem.
In @17#, Gottesman proved that the (1,r)-threshold
scheme can be substituted by an (r ,2r21)-threshold scheme
~a majority function!. We earlier saw that an
(r ,2r21)-threshold scheme cannot be improved. However,
all the (q ,q)-threshold schemes used to implement the logi-
cal AND can be substituted by a (1,1)-quantum secret-sharing
scheme plus a (q ,q)-classical secret-sharing scheme. There-
fore, we see that a large group of general access structures
can also be improved. However, it is clear that the improved
access structure achieved by this construction is not minimal
in general.
IV. FEATURES
Besides reducing the amount of quantum data that must
be given to the set of players in order to share a quantum
secret, another advantage of the hybrid quantum secret-
sharing schemes is that they make possible a straightforward
application of several features that are available for classical
secret-sharing schemes and are not yet known to be valid in
the quantum scenario. We briefly explain these features in
this section.
The security of an (k ,n)-threshold scheme is ensured iff
an adversary is restricted to compromise less than k players
during the whole lifetime of the secret. This is a quite strong
assumption for long-term secrets. In order to cope with this
problem, Herzberg et al. proposed in @20# a scheme where
the shares are periodically renewed without changing the se-
cret. It is easy to see that this construction applies to our
hybrid secret-sharing scheme, therefore creating a proactive
quantum secret-sharing scheme. To do so, we just use a pro-
active secret-sharing scheme to share the classical key K, and
we periodically change the classical shares among the play-
ers. It is important to note that we still do not know whether
such a protocol exists or not in a pure quantum secret-
sharing scheme.
Another interesting scheme that becomes available in the
hybrid scheme is secret sharing with prevention. In a
(k ,n ,p)-secret sharing with prevention scheme, any group of
p users can avoid all the other users to reconstructing the
secret. Obviously, this scheme supposes that the players send
their shares to a center in order to reconstruct it. This scheme
was proposed in @21#. It becomes available in the quantum
scenario in the same way as the proactive scheme, by apply-
ing it to the classical scheme used to share the key.
As a final example, we cite secret-sharing schemes with
disenrollment @22#. In this scheme, a player can be excluded
without setting a new scheme. We see that this scheme does
not directly apply to our hybrid scheme. However, if we
regard the players who will hold quantum shares as high
reliable ones and that they will not be excluded of the
scheme, it becomes implantable. However, only the players
who hold only classical data can be excluded. Other varia-
tions, like nonperfect secret-sharing schemes, gradual disclo-
sure of a secret, among others can be achieved in the same
way.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a hybrid classical-quantum secret-sharing
scheme that shares a quantum secret among a set of players
such that only authorized groups can recover the secret and
unauthorized groups have no information about it. We
proved that for several access structures, this scheme can be
implemented with less quantum shares than in a conven-
tional quantum secret-sharing scheme. Additionally, some
features of classical secret-sharing schemes, whose availabil-
ity was not even known in the quantum domain, became
available. We did not address the robustness against noise
and/or cheating in the proposed protocol. Clearly, there is a
trade-off between the improvability of an access structure
and its robustness. If only one player holds the quantum
shares and if anything happens to this state, the secret will be
destroyed forever. We state the analysis of this problem as a
future research topic.
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